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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
listed upon the Exchanges as negotiable securities. If they are thus listed
any innocent purchaser is always taking the risk that the true owner will
some day reclaim them.
P. A. M. '36.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS-
MoRATORIum LEGIsLATION.-In Home Building and Loan Association V.
Blaisdelli the Supreme Court held that a provision of the Minnesota Mort-
gage Act of 19332 for a two-year moratorium on mortgages was not an
impairment of the obligation of a contract under the contract clause of the
Constitution nor an infringement of the due process provision of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The law applied to mortgages existing at the effective
date of the law and provided that mortgagors, by judicial proceedings, might
secure a stay of foreclosures for a period not extending beyond May, 1935,
and varying according to the circumstances of each case. The act further
provided that in the proceedings which it authorized an order might be had
upon notice "determining the reasonable value of the income on said prop-
erty, or, if the property has no income, then the reasonable rental value of
the property...., and directing and requiring such mortgagor or judgment
debtor, to pay all or a reasonable part of such income, or rental value, in
or toward the payment of taxes, insurance, interest, mortgage, or judgment
indebtedness at such times and in such manner as shall be fixed and deter-
mined and ordered by the court." The act recited an emergency, occasioned
by the depression.
Since the Minnesota Mortgage case three decisions have clarified the
position of the Supreme Court on the general subject of retroactive legisla-
tion applied to debts. In W. B. Worthen Company v. ThomaS3 the Court
declared unconstitutional an Arkansas statute which exempted the benefit
payments on life, sickness, and accident insurance policies from legal process
for the satisfaction of any indebtedness existing at the time the act was
passed.4 Just before the law became effective the plaintiff company had
garnished a payment to a beneficiary by an insurance company, thus ac-
quiring a lien under the Arkansas law.6 The statute was upheld by the
State supreme court,6 but was reversed in the Supreme Court of the
United States on the ground that it impaired the obligation of contracts.
The Arkansas legislature, unlike that of Minnesota, made no attempt to
discriminate on the basis of need on the part of debtors or classes of debtors
1 (1934) 290 U. S. 398.
2Laws of Minnesota, 1933, p. 514.
3 (1934) 292 U. S. 426.
Laws of Arkansas, 1933, p. 321.
5 Desha v. Baker (1840) 3 Ark. 509, 520, 521; Martin v. Foreman (1856)
18 Ark. 249, 251; Smith v. Butler (1904) 72 Ark. 350, 351, 80 S. W. 580;
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Vanderberg (1909) 91 Ark. 252, 255,
120 S. W. 993; Foster v. Pollack Co. (1927) 173 Ark. 48, 51, 291 S. W.
989.
6 (1933) 65 S. W. (2d) 917.
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and made no attempt to limit the resultant sacrifice of contractual rights.
The Court distinguished the Blaisdell case as follows: "We held that when
the exercise of the reserved power of the State, in order to meet public need
because of a pressing public disaster, relates to the enforcement of existing
contracts, that action must be limited by reasonable conditions appropriate
to the emergency.... Accordingly, in the case of Blaisdell, we sustained
the Minnesota mortgage moratorium law in the light of the temporary and
conditional relief which the legislation granted. . . . In the instant case,
the relief sought to be afforded is neither temporary or conditional. In
placing insurance moneys beyond the reach of existing creditors, the act
contains no limitations as to time, amount, circumstances, or need."' 7
In W. B. Worthen Company v. Kavanaugh8 a series of acts of the legis-
lature of Arkansas, virtually empowering special improvement districts to
repudiate their bonds was also held unconstitutional. This act, in addition
to reducing interest and penalties on unpaid benefit assessments, prolonged
the minimum time within which property might be sold for their non-pay-
ment from sixty-five days to two and one-half years and provided for a
further four-year period of redemption during which the landowner might
remain in possession without payment of any kind. 9 The constitutionality
of the law was defended upon the grounds of an emergency which the act
declared to exist, and because the changes wrought by the act merely altered
the remedy under the law, not the substance of the contract. But the
Supreme Court held that although the dividing line between changes of
substance and changes of remedy is obscure, 10 "not even changes of remedy
may be pressed so far as to cut down the security of the mortgage without
moderation or reason or in the spirit of oppression. Even where the public
welfare is involved these bounds must be respected."" After stating that
the act had taken from the mortgage "the quality of an acceptable invest-
ment for a rational investor,"'12 the court distinguished this statute from
7 W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, supra, n. 3, 1. c. 433.
9 (1935) 55 Sup. Ct. 555.
9Laws of Arkansas, 1933, p. 375, 790, 868.
10 "The distinction between the obligations of a contract and the remedy
given by the legislature to enforce the obligation, has been taken at the bar,
and exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the obligations of
the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the
nation shall direct." Marshall, C. J. in Sturges v. Crowninshield (1819)
4 Wheat. 200, 4 L. Ed. 529. In Von Hoffman v. Quincy (1866) 4 Wall.
553, 18 L. Ed. 403, Swayne, J. said: "It is competent for the states to
change the form of the remedy or to modify it otherwise as they see fit,
provided no substantial right secured by the contract is thereby impaired.
No attempt has been made to fix definitely the line between alterations of
the remedy, which are deemed legitimate, and those which under the form
of modifying the remedy, impair substantial rights. Every case must be
determined on its own circumstances." Waite C. J. in Antoni v. Greenhow
(1882) 107 U. S. 769, 2 Sup. Ct. 91, 27 L. Ed. 468, added: "In all such
cases therefore the question becomes one of reasonableness and of that the
legislature is primarily the judge."
11 55 Sup. Ct. at 557 per Cardozo, J.
12 Ibid.
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the one at issue in the Blaisdell case by noting the absence of the restric-
tions approved in the latter case. "None of these restrictions or anything
approaching them is present in this case. There has not been even an at-
tempt to assimilate what was done by this decree to the discretionary action
of a chancellor in subjecting an equitable remedy to an equitable condi-
tion."1S
The two Worthen Company cases proved the basis for the decision of
the court in the more recent case of Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radfordl4 in which the Frazier-Lemke Act 1 was declared unconstitutional.
Radford had given a mortgage to the Louisville Bank to secure a note for
nine thousand dollars which he was to repay in installments. He defaulted
in 1932 and after long negotiations in an effort to reach a settlement the
bank declared the indebtedness immediately payable and began a suit to
foreclose. Radford then filed in bankruptcy under the Frazier-Lemke Act.
It was provided in paragraph three of the Act that the bankrupt may,
if the mortgagee assents, purchase the property at the present appraised
value, acquiring title thereto as well as immediate possession, by agreeing
to make deferred payments for six years at a very low rate of interest,
beginning with one percent for the first year. By paragraph seven the bank-
rupt might, if the mortgagee refused assent to immediate purchase on the
above terms, require the bankruptcy court to stay all proceedings for five
years, during which time the debtor might retain possession of all or any
part of his property under the control of the court upon payment of a rea-
sonable annual rental. The first rental payments were due in six months,
payments to be distributed to ALL creditors. At the end of five years the
debtor may pay into court the appraised price of the property of which he
has retained possession. Lienholder may request a reappraisal which debtor
will have to pay. The act applies only to indebtedness incurred before its
passage.
The bank contended that the Act extended the bankruptcy power of
Congress beyond its proper scope and that the Act violated the due process
provision of the Fifth Amendment. The court held upon the latter ground
that "statutes for the relief of mortgagors are sustained when they are
found to preserve substantially the right of the mortgagee to obtain through
application of the security, payment of the indebtedness. The same statutes
are invalid when it appears that this substantive right has been substan-
tially abridged."1 6 The Blaisdell case was further distinguished because it
specifically limited the emergency period and even provided for a further
limitation at the discretion of the court."7 Finally the court held the Frazier-
Lemke Act unconstitutional because it deprived the mortgagee of rights
under the Kentucky laws which permitted retention until the indebtedness
13 55 Sup. Ct. at 558 per Cardozo, J.
14 (1935) 55 Sup. Ct. 854.
25 48 Stat. 1289, 11 USCA 203 (s).
16 Per Brandeis, J. citing Home Building and Loan Co. v. Blaisdell, supra,
note 1, and W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, supra, note 8.
7 "Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, supra, n. 14, 1. c. 867.
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was paid, realization upon the security at a public sale, determination of
when the sale should be held, the right to bid at the sale, and the right
to control the property during the period of default.18 The Court added by
way of dictum that the scope of the Congressional bankruptcy power was
not limited by the power that Congress had exercised under it in the past
but only by the Fifth Amendment.1 9
W. R. E. '37.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-J URY TRIAL-NEw TRIAL FOR DIRECTION OF VER-
DICT.-At a time when most courts are far behind in their dockets and any
prolongation of litigation adds considerably to its cost, both the legal pro-
fession and its clients should welcome any decision sustaining the validity
of a method of procedure by which a large number of new trials can be
avoided. The Supreme Court of the United States has recently made such
a decision in the case of Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman (1935)
55 S. Ct. 890. Plaintiff brought an action in the Federal District Court
in New York to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the negli-
gence of defendant. At the conclusion of the evidence defendant moved for
a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence could not support a
verdict for the plaintiff. The court expressly reserving the legal issue
whether it should direct a verdict for defendant, submitted the case to the
jury, which found for the plaintiff. The court then ruled for the plaintiff
on the point of law reserved and defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals
held that upon the evidence the trial court should have granted defendant's
motion, and ordered a new trial, denying defendant's motion for dismissal
of the complaint. The Court of Appeals stated that a new trial was re-
quired by the decision of the Supreme Court in Slocum v. N. Y. Life Ins.
Co. (1912) 228 U. S. 364. Defendant then obtained a writ of certiorari
from the Supreme Court which granted his motion for dismissal of the
complaint and held that a new trial was unnecessary.
Before considering the grounds of the present decision it is well to recall
the opinion in the Slocum case, which the Supreme Court held inapplicable.
That was an action in the Federal District Court in Pennsylvania upon a
life insurance policy. The defendant's motion for a directed verdict was
denied, and the jury found for the plaintiff. The defendant then asked for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, allowed by a Pennsylvania statute,
on the ground that his motion should have been granted. His request was
denied by the trial court, but on appeal the Court of Appeals sustained his
contention and entered judgment for him. Plaintiff took the issue to the
Supreme Court insisting that his constitutional right to jury trial had been
violated. A bare majority of the judges held that the Court of Appeals was
right in reversing the judgment but that it should have granted a new
trial. It was decided that the Seventh Amendment preserved the right to
18 Ibid., 1. c. 865-66.
19 Ibid., 1. c. 862-3.
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